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David Wolpert on impossibility, incompleteness, the liar paradox, the limits of computation, 
a non-quantum mechanical uncertainty principle and the universe as computer—the 
ultimate theorem in Turing Machine Theory 
     ABSTRACT 
I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the universe as 
computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of polymath physicist and 
decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a single citation and so I present this 
very brief summary. Wolpert proved some stunning impossibility or incompleteness 
theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so 
general they are independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent of 
the laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior. They 
make use of Cantor's diagonalization, the liar paradox and worldlines to provide what may 
be the ultimate theorem in Turing Machine Theory, and seemingly provide insights into 
impossibility,incompleteness, the limits of computation,and the universe as computer, in all 
possible universes and all beings or mechanisms, generating, among other things,a non-
quantum mechanical uncertainty principle and a proof of monotheism. 
 
I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the universe as 
computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of polymath physicist and 
decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a single citation and so I present this 
very brief abstract. Wolpert proved some stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems 
(1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits to inference  (computation) that are so general 
they are independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent of the 
laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior, which he 
summarized thusly:    “One cannot build a physical computer that can be assured of 
correctly processing information faster than the universe does. The results also mean that 
there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose observation apparatus, and that there 
cannot be an infallible, general-purpose control apparatus. These results do not rely on 
systems that are inﬁnite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also 
hold even if one uses an inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely dense computer, with computational 
powers greater than that of a Turing Machine.”  He also published what seems to be the 
first serious work on team or collective intelligence (COIN) which he says puts this subject 
on a sound scientific footing.   Although he has published various versions of these over two 
decades in some of the most prestigious peer reviewed physics journals (e.g., Physica D 
237: 257-81(2008)) as well as in NASA journals and has gotten news items in major 
science journals, few seem to have noticed and I have looked in dozens of recent books on 
physics, math,decision theory and computation without finding a reference.  
It is most unfortunate that almost nobody is aware of Wolpert, since his work can be seen 
as the ultimate extension of computing, thinking, inference, incompleteness, and 
undecidability, which he achieves (like many proofs in Turing machine theory) by extending 
the liar paradox and Cantors diagonalization to include all possible universes and all beings 
or mechanisms and thus may be seen  as the last word not only on computation, but on 
cosmology or even deities.  He achieves this extreme generality by partitioning the inferring 
universe using  worldlines  (i.e., in terms of what it does and not how it does it) so that his 
mathematical proofs are independent of any particular physical laws or  computational 
structures in establishing the physical limits of inference for past, present and future and all 
possible calculation, observation and control.  He notes that even in a classical universe 
Laplace was wrong about being able to perfectly predict the future (or even perfectly  depict 
the past or present) and that his impossibility results can be viewed as a “non-quantum 
mechanical uncertainty principle”(i.e., there cannot be an infallible observation or control 
device).  Any universal physical device must be infinite, it can only be so at one moment in 
time, and no reality can have more than one (the “monotheism theorem”).  Since space and 
time do not appear in the definition, the device can even be the entire universe across all 
time. It can be viewed as a physical analog of incompleteness with two inference devices 
rather than one self-referential device.  As he says, “either the Hamiltonian of our universe 
proscribes a certain type of computation, or prediction complexity is unique (unlike 
algorithmic  information complexity) in that there is one and only one version of it that can 
be applicable throughout our universe.”  Another way to say this is that one cannot have 
two physical inference devices (computers) both capable of being asked arbitrary questions 
about the output of the other, or that the universe cannot contain a computer to which one 
can pose any arbitrary computational task, or that for any pair of physical inference 
engines, there are always binary valued questions about the state of the universe that 
cannot even be posed to at least one of them.  One cannot build a computer that can 
predict an arbitrary future condition of a physical system before it occurs, even if the 
condition is from a restricted set of tasks that can be posed to it—that is, it cannot process 
information (though this is a vexed phrase as many including John Searle and Rupert Read 
note) faster than the universe.  The computer and the arbitrary physical system it is 
computing do not have to be physically coupled and it holds regardless of the laws of 
physics, chaos, quantum mechanics, causality or light cones and even for an infinite speed 
of light.  The inference device does not have to be spatially localized but can be nonlocal 
dynamical processes occurring across the entire universe.  He is well aware that this puts 
the speculations of Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd etc., concerning the universe as 
computer or the limits of ”information processing”, in a new light (though the indices of 
their writings make no reference to him and another remarkable omission is that none of 
the above are mentioned by Yanofsky  in his recent comprehensive book ‘The Outer Limits 
of Reason’ (see my review).  Wolpert says he shows that ‘the universe’ cannot contain an 
inference device that can ‘process information’ as fast as it can, and since he shows you 
cannot have a perfect memory nor perfect control, its past, present or future state can 
never be perfectly or completely depicted, characterized, known or copied.  He also proved 
that no combination of computers with error correcting codes can overcome these 
limitations.  Wolpert also notes the critical importance of the observer (“the liar”) and this 
connects us to the familiar conundrums of physics, math and language.   As noted in my 
other articles I think that definitive comments on many relevant issues here (completeness, 
certainty, the nature of computation etc.) were made long ago by Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
here is one relevant comment of Juliet Floyd on Wittgenstein: ”He is articulating in other 
words a generalized form of diagonalization. The argument is thus generally applicable, not 
only to decimal expansions, but to any purported listing or rule-governed expression of 
them; it does not rely on any particular notational device or preferred spatial arrangements 
of signs. In that sense, Wittgenstein’s argument appeals to no picture and it is not 
essentially diagrammatical or representational, though it may be diagrammed and insofar as 
it is a logical argument, its logic may be represented formally). Like Turing’s arguments, it 
is free of a direct tie to any particular formalism. Unlike Turing’s arguments, it explicitly 
invokes the notion of a language-game and applies to (and presupposes) an everyday 
conception of the notions of rules and of the humans who follow them. Every line in the 
diagonal presentation above is conceived as an instruction or command, analogous to an 
order given to a human being...”   The parallels to Wolpert are obvious. 
However once again note that “infinite”, “compute”, “information” etc., only have meaning  
(i.e., are transitive (Wittgenstein) or have  COS--Conditions of Satisfaction (Searle) in 
specific human contexts—that is, as Searle has emphasized, they are all observer relative or 
ascribed vs intrinsically intentional. The universe apart from our psychology is neither finite 
nor infinite and cannot compute nor process anything. Only in our language games do our 
laptop or the universe compute.  
However not everyone is oblivious to Wolpert.  Well known econometricians Koppl and 
Rosser in their famous 2002 paper “All that I have to say has already crossed your mind” 
give three theorems on the limits to rationality, prediction and control in economics. The 
first uses Wolpert’s theorem on the limits to computability to show some logical limits to 
forecasting the future. Wolpert notes that it can be viewed as the physical analog of Godel’s 
incompleteness theorem and K and R say that their variant can be viewed as its social 
science analog, though Wolpert is well aware of the social implications. Since Godel’s 
theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing algorithmic randomness 
(incompleteness) throughout math (which is just another of our symbolic systems), it 
seems inescapable that thinking (behavior) is full of impossible, random or incomplete 
statements and situations.  Since we can view each of these domains as symbolic systems 
evolved by chance to make our psychology work, perhaps it should be regarded as 
unsurprising that they are not “complete”. For math, Chaitin says this ‘randomness’ (again a 
group of Language Games in Wittgenstein’s terms)  shows there are limitless theorems that 
are true but unprovable—i.e., true for no reason. One should then be able to say that there 
are limitless statements that make perfect “grammatical” sense that do not describe actual 
situations attainable in that domain. I suggest these puzzles go away if one considers W’s 
views. He wrote many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole of his work 
concerns the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme context sensitivity of language, math 
and logic, and the recent papers of Rodych, Floyd and Berto are the best introduction I 
know of to W’s remarks on the foundations of mathematics and so to philosophy.  
K and R ‘s second theorem shows possible nonconvergence for Bayesian (probabilistic) 
forecasting in infinite-dimensional space. The third shows the impossibility of a computer 
perfectly forecasting an economy with agents knowing its forecasting program. The astute 
will notice that these theorems can be seen as versions of the liar paradox, and the fact that 
we are caught in impossibilities when we try to calculate a system that includes ourselves 
has been noted by Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser and others in these contexts and again we have 
circled back to the puzzles of physics when the observer is involved. K&R conclude “Thus, 
economic order is partly the product of something other than calculative rationality”. 
Bounded rationality is now a major field in itself, the subject of thousands of papers and 
hundreds of books.  And this seemingly abstruse work of Wolpert’s may have implications 
for all rationality. Of course one must keep in mind that (as Wittgenstein noted) math and 
logic are all syntax and no semantics and they have nothing to tell us until connected to our 
life by language (i.e., by psychology) and so it is easy to do this in ways that are useful 
(meaningful or having COS) or not (no clear COS).  
 
